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Abstract
This paper surveys models of markets in which only some consumers are savvy.
I discuss when the presence of savvy consumers improves the deals available to all
consumers in the market (the case of search externalities), and when the non-savvy
fund generous deals for all consumers (ripo¤ externalities). I also discuss when the
two groups of consumers have aligned or divergent views about market interventions.
The analysis focusses on two kinds of models: (i) an indivisible product in a market
with price dispersion, and (ii) products which involve add-on pricing.
Keywords: Add-on pricing, bounded rationality, consumer protection, consumer
search, externalities, price dispersion.
1 Introduction
This paper examines situations in which savvyand non-savvyconsumers interact in
the marketplace. An old intuition in economics suggests that savvy consumers help to
protect other consumers, and intervention to protect vulnerable consumers is needed only
when there are insu¢ cient numbers of savvy types present in the market. In broad terms,
a search externalityoperates so that those consumers who are informed about the deals
available in the market ensure that less informed consumers also obtain reasonable out-
comes. More recent work, however, has examined situations where consumers benet from
the presence of non-savvy types. In such markets, a ripo¤ externalityis present some
consumers end up buying services they do not value, say, which help fund generous deals
elsewhere and vulnerable consumers may need protection even when they are relatively
few in number.
Department of Economics and All Souls College, University of Oxford. Early versions of this paper
were presented to the 2013 Annual Meeting of German Economic Association in Düsseldorf and to the
2014 conference on Industrial Organization: theory, empirics and experiments organized by the University
of Salento. I am grateful for discussions on this topic to Kyle Bagwell, Renaud Foucart, Michael Grubb,
Andrew Rhodes, Tom Ross, Rani Spiegler, Vic Tremblay, John Vickers, and Jidong Zhou.
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This paper discusses two principal issues. First, what determines the direction of inter-
consumer externalities in a market? That is, when do savvy consumers protect other
consumers, when do non-savvy consumers improve the deals o¤ered to the savvy, or when
is there no interaction between the two groups at all? Second, which kinds of market
interventions such as policies to increase the number of sellers, to constrain high prices,
or to increase the number of savvy types in the market benet both consumer groups
and which benet one group at the expense of the other?
For our purposes, there are two broad notions of savviness to consider. First, a consumer
might be well informed about the prices, product qualities or her idiosyncratic value for
the product. For instance, a savvy consumer knows whether a given wine will likely be to
her taste just by looking at the label, or a savvy consumer looking for a new television may
know the range of available prices (e.g., because she is online). Alternatively, a consumer
might be strategically savvy, in that she has a good understanding of the game being
played in the market. For instance, consumers might be unable to discern product quality
(so they are not savvy in the rst sense) but they understand how quality depends on
price in equilibrium and buy accordingly. Or they might foresee a rms incentive to set
its future prices. A consumer who is savvy in this sense is aware of her future behaviour,
while a strategically naive consumer might not predict accurately what she will want or
need in the future.
A consumer might be non-savvy in both senses. For instance, she might not be able to
discern quality and also might not foresee how quality depends on price. Indeed, strategic
naivety might be the cause of information problems. In a market where in fact there is
price dispersion but naive consumers think that all sellers o¤er the same price, for example,
a naive consumer might choose not to incur the search cost required to become informed
about prices in the market.
A framework for discussing these issues is the following.1 Suppose there are two kinds
of consumers, savvy and non-savvy, and the proportion of savvy consumers in the
population is . To focus on the impact of savviness on outcomes, I suppose that there
are no systematic di¤erences in tastes for the product in question across the two groups of
consumers. For the most part, I take the extent of savviness, , to be exogenous and out
of the control of consumers and sellers.
1For a similar approach, see Armstrong (2008, section III.C) and Armstrong and Vickers (2012).
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Let VS() and VN() denote the expected net surplus enjoyed in equilibrium by an
individual savvy and non-savvy consumer respectively, while V ()  VS()+(1 )VN()
measures aggregate consumer surplus. We expect that VS()  VN(), so that savvy
consumers obtain weakly better deals than their non-savvy counterparts. This is because
tastes do not di¤er across the two groups of consumer, and a savvy type could mimic a non-
savvy buying strategy and so obtain surplus VN .2 In situations where this makes economic
sense, the di¤erence VS()  VN() represents a consumers incentive to become savvy
when  other consumers are already savvy. A rational, but uninformed, buyer must obtain
non-negative surplus VN  0, for otherwise she would choose to stay out of the market.
However, a strategically naive consumer might experience negative surplus. In many cases
VS and VN move the same way with  i.e., either both increase with , both decrease
with , or neither depends on  although it is not inevitable this be so.3
Likewise, let S() and N() denote the prot generated in equilibrium by an indi-
vidual savvy and non-savvy consumer respectively, while ()  S() + (1  )N()
measures industry prot. Here, it is less clear how S and N compare, although in most
of the situations discussed in this paper non-savvy consumers generate more prot than
the savvy and S()  N(). In perfectly competitive situations we expect average
prot to be zero, although prot extracted from one group might be used to subsidize the
o¤er made to the other. Finally, let W () = V () + () denote total welfare when 
consumers are savvy.
In this paper I focus on three cases of interest:
Search externalities: When consumers are better o¤when the proportion of savvy types is
larger that is, when VN() and VS() increase with  I say that search externalities
are present. This is because the leading example where savvy consumers protect non-savvy
consumers is when the former are better informed about prices or qualities available in the
market. When more consumers are aware of all the available deals this forces sellers to
o¤er good deals, which in turn are available to non-savvy buyers (as well as to other savvy
buyers).4
2However, as illustrated in section 2.3, there are situations in which replacing a population of savvy
buyers with a population of non-savvy buyers will make buyers better o¤. There are also cases where the
two kinds of consumer obtain the same surplus. (As in section 3.1, this is the case when all sellers o¤er
the same single deal.)
3For instance, in section 3.3 it may be that VN increases with  while VS decreases with .
4The headline of the UKs Daily Telegraph on 9 July 2014 was Savvy shoppers force down prices.
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Ripo¤ externalities: When individual consumers are better o¤ when the proportion of
savvy types is smaller that is, when VN() and VS() decrease with  I say ripo¤
externalitiesare present. A leading example of this situation is when non-savvy consumers
can be ripped o¤with extra charges, and the resulting revenue is passed back to all
consumers in the form of subsidized headline price. It is possible that aggregate consumer
surplus V rises with , even though both VS and VN fall with , if the gap (VS   VN) is
large (as is the case in section 3.3).
No interactions between consumers: On the boundary between these cases are situations in
which there is no interaction between the two groups of consumers, and VS and VN do not
depend on . These cases often involve biased beliefs on the part of non-savvy consumers.
Here, competition delivers what each type of consumer thinks they want, and neither
wishes to choose the deal o¤ered to the other type. Ex post, though, biassed consumers
might regret the deal they chose. (A lucky charm to help predict winning lottery numbers,
say, has no impact on the savvy consumers who do not buy it, but may be attractive ex
ante to gullible consumers.)
The plan for the rest of this paper is as follows. Models which generate price dispersion
are examined in section 2, and I present three models to exemplify the three patterns
of externalities listed above. Models with add-on pricing are presented in section 3, and
again variants are chosen to illustrate the three patterns of externality. One lesson from
the analysis is that small changes in model assumptions can swing the market from one
kind of externality to the other, and the small print in the model matters. I end the
paper with some concluding comments, including suggestions for markets outside these
two families where search or ripo¤ externalities are likely to be present.
2 Price Dispersion
2.1 Search externalities
In a market for an indivisible good of known quality, it is plausible that when some con-
sumers are aware of available prices and buy from the cheapest seller, those who shop
less diligently are partially protected. To illustrate this, consider Varian (1980)s classical
model of price dispersion.5 Here, n identical sellers supply a homogeneous product with
5See Salop and Stiglitz (1977) for closely related analysis. (This paper appears to have introduced the
term ripo¤into the academic economic literature.)
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unit cost c. Consumers may di¤er in their reservation value for the item, v, where the frac-
tion of consumers with v  p is denoted q(p). For ease of notation, write (p)  (p c)q(p)
for prot with price p, which I assume is single-peaked in p, and pM for the price which
maximizes this prot. An exogenous fraction  of consumers (independent of valuation
v) are savvy, in the sense that they buy from the cheapest seller, while the other 1   
consumers buy from a random seller so long as that sellers price is below their v.6
In cases where all consumers are savvy or all are non-savvy, there is a pure strategy
equilibrium and no price dispersion. If  = 1, so that all consumers shop around, there is
Bertrand competition and price is driven down to cost c. If  = 0, so that all consumers
shop randomly, then no seller has an incentive to set price below the monopoly price
pM , and the outcome is as if a single seller supplied the market. Since there is no price
dispersion, it follows that VN = VS and N = S in these extreme cases. (Here, V and
 refer to the expected value of a consumers surplus and prot, with expectations taken
over the idiosyncratic valuation v.)
However, in a mixed market with 0 <  < 1, the only (static) equilibrium involves a
mixed strategy for prices, so there is price dispersion in the market and a savvy consumer
obtains a (weakly) lower price than any non-savvy consumer. It follows that VS > VN and
S < N . In more detail, the symmetric equilibrium involves each of the n sellers choosing
its price according to a cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (p), which satises
(1  F (p))n 1 + 1
n
(1  ) (p)  1
n
(1  )(pM) : (1)
Here, a seller which chooses price p will sell to all  savvy consumers (who have v  p)
provided all of its rivals choose a higher price, which occurs with probability (1 F (p))n 1
in this equilibrium. On the other hand, the seller will always sell to its share of the 1  
non-savvy consumers (who have v  p). As such, a sellers demand from the non-savvy
consumers is less elastic than demand from the savvy. The left-hand side of (1) is therefore
the sellers prot if it sets price p. Since the seller could decide only to serve its captive
consumers, who are 1
n
(1   ) in number, with the monopoly price, the right-hand side
represents a sellers available prot.7 For a seller to be willing to play the mixed strategy
6This behaviour could be justied if each consumers cost of search is very convex, in the sense that a
consumer can visit one seller for free but nds it too costly ever to visit a second seller. A fraction  are
informed of each sellers price, while the remaining 1  consumers are informed of no price. An alternative
interpretation of this inert behaviour is that 1  consumers are strategically naive, and mistakenly believe
that competition ensures the law of one priceoperates and all sellers o¤er the same price.
7It is not an equilibrium for sellers to choose the monopoly price p = pM for sure, since a seller could
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F (), it must be indi¤erent between all prices in the support of F ().
Given p, the value of F (p) which solves (1) is an increasing function of . That is,
when the fraction of savvy consumers is higher, each seller is more likely to set low prices.
Intuitively, increasing  expands the portion of demand which is elastic. Because each
sellers price distribution is shifted downwards when  rises, both the savvy (who pay the
minimum price from n draws) and the non-savvy (who pay the price from a single draw)
are better o¤when  is higher. In the notation of section 1, then, VS and VN increase with
, as does aggregate consumer surplus V . From (1), industry prot is () = (1 )(pM),
which decreases with . Total welfare W () at least weakly increases with  since lower
prices stimulate demand.8
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Figure 1: Expected surplus with price dispersion (n = 2 and n = 4)
Figure 1 depicts the net surpluses VS and VN enjoyed by the savvy (the upper solid
curve) and the inert (lower solid curve) consumers when all consumers are willing to pay
v = 1 for the item and c = 0, so that (p) = p if p  1, and when n = 2. Note that the
extent of price dispersion, as captured by the gap between the minimum and average price
slightly undercut this price and thereby serve all the savvy consumers.
8Armstrong and Zhou (2011, section 1) extend this model of price dispersion so that, instead of pur-
chasing from a random seller, a sales intermediary steers the non-savvy consumers towards a supplier of his
choice if given an incentive by that supplier to do so. (The savvy consumers are immune to the salesmans
patter, observe the full list of retail prices, and buy from the cheapest supplier.) In equilibrium, there is
a positive relationship between a suppliers choice of retail price and per-sale commission, and non-savvy
consumers buy the most expensive product. One can show that the search externality is present in this
market, and savvy consumers who are able to withstand sales pressure benet all consumers in this market
for advice.
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in the market, is non-monotonic in . (As discussed, there is no price dispersion in the
extreme cases where  = 0 or  = 1.) As such, increasing  might increase or decrease the
extent of price dispersion in a market, depending on the initial level of savviness.9
The two solid curves on Figure 1 are rather close together, indicating there is a limited
benet to a consumer in knowing both prices. When the number of sellers is larger, however,
one can show that the expected price paid by savvy consumers falls while the expected
price paid by the non-savvy consumers rises, so the two curves are stretched further apart.
Intuitively, a rms demand from the savvy consumers, (1   F )n 1, falls with n faster
than its demand from the non-savvy, (1   )=n, and so with larger n a rm puts more
weight on extracting revenue from the latter group. (One can see that the prices paid by
informed and uninformed consumers must move in opposite directions as n increases, since
industry prot () = (1 )(pM) does not depend on n.) The dashed lines on the gure
show the respective surplus functions in this example when n = 4. Thus, increasing the
number of sellers has contrasting e¤ects on the informed and the uninformed consumers,
with the non-savvy su¤ering with more competitionof this form.10
Making the fraction of savvy types endogenous: The discussion so far has taken the frac-
tion of savvy types as exogenous. However, it may be that consumers can choose to be
savvy, for instance by investing in acquiring market information. When information about
market conditions and product attributes is costly to acquire, it may be rational to stay
uninformed, especially when the search externality is present and most other consumers
are already well informed.11 To discuss the equilibrium extent of savviness, continue with
Varians model of price dispersion, and when the fraction of savvy types is  write a savvy
consumers surplus as VS() and the surplus of an uninformed consumer as VN(). (The
following argument is easiest if I assume all consumers have the same value v for the prod-
uct, so that all consumers will buy in equilibrium.) As illustrated on Figure 1, VS and VN
increase with , while the incentive to become informed, VS()  VN(), is hump-shaped
such that VS(0)  VN(0) = VS(1)  VN(1) = 0.
9Brown and Goolsbee (2002) nd evidence consistent with this, when they observe that price dispersion
rises when the use of price comparison websites increases from a low level, and then decreases as their use
becomes more widespread.
10See Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton (2006) for further discussion of the impact of changing  and n on
payo¤s to consumers. These authors also conduct an experiment, where human sellers face computer
consumers, and which conrms the models predictions quite closely.
11The issue of how many agents rationally decide to remain uninformed in equilibrium was highlighted
early on by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Burdett and Judd (1983).
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Suppose that consumers can switch from being ignorant to informed by incurring an
up-front information acquisition cost, . As discussed in Burdett and Judd (1983, section
3.2), a consumer will choose to become informed if and only if VS()   VN()  , and
consumers will choose to become informed until the marginal consumer is indi¤erent. Thus,
the fraction  of consumers who become informed in an equilibrium with 0 <  < 1 satises
VS()  VN() =  : (2)
If  is too large, there is no solution to (2) and the only equilibrium involves no consumers
becoming informed and sellers charging the monopoly price.12
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Figure 2: The fraction of consumers who choose to be informed
Figure 2 illustrates the incentive to become informed in the duopoly example from
Figure 1, so that the hump-shaped curve depicts the di¤erence between the two solid
curves on Figure 1, VS()   VN(). The at dashed line represents the cost of becoming
informed ( is equal to 1
20
on the gure). The gure shows a situation with two interior
equilibria satisfying (2). However, only the higher- equilibrium is stable, while at the
low- equilibrium a perturbation in  will induce  to move away from this point. As
emphasized by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) in a related model, it is never an equilibrium
for all consumers to become informed. In an interior equilibrium, the search externality
12Even if (2) has a solution, it is always one equilibrium for all consumers to remain uninformed. When
no one is informed, all consumers obtain the same (bad) deal in the market, and there is no point in an
individual consumer spending  > 0 to acquire information about the available deals.
8
implies that too few consumers choose to be informed too many prefer to free-ride on other
consumerssearch e¤orts and consumer surplus would be boosted if  were increased.13
One can imagine consumer policies which a¤ect either left-hand or right-hand side of
expression (2), i.e., either the cost or the benet of being savvy. Assuming that it is
the high- equilibrium on Figure 2 which is relevant, a policy which reduces information
acquisition costs so that  is lowered will increase , and this will in turn benet all
consumers. Likewise, a policy which shifts the benet curve upwards will increase equi-
librium . For example, we saw on Figure 1 that increasing the number of sellers pushed
the surplus of the two groups of consumers further apart, and so shifted the benet curve
upwards. Since this will increase , it may be that increasing the number of sellers will
benet all consumers not just the savvy once the equilibrium impact on  is taken into
account.14
On the other hand, a policy which shifts the benet curve downwards will reduce the
fraction of consumers who choose to become informed.15 Consider the situation with two
sellers, consumer valuation v = 1 and costless production as depicted on Figures 1 and
2. Suppose that any consumer can become informed of both prices, rather than having to
shop randomly, by incurring the cost  = 1
20
. In this case, a fraction   0:95 of consumers
choose to be informed and all consumers have expected surplus (net of the search cost
where relevant) of about 0:9, i.e., their outlay is around 0:1. Here, most consumers obtain
what seems like a good deal, obtaining the item in return for a total outlay which is only
10% of their valuation. However, a few consumers will pay up to ten times this price, and
pressure from the media, politicians, or consumer groups to protect consumers from
these occasional high prices could arise. In response, suppose that a new policy constrains
rms to set prices no higher than 1
4
, say, so that the maximum permitted price is one
quarter of the highest price seen without regulation. For given , the expected prices
13Aggregate consumer surplus when  consumers become informed is (VS() )+(1 )VN (), which
is strictly increasing in  at any point satisfying (2).
14To take an extreme example, if all consumers have a relatively high information acquisition cost  = 15 ,
then by examining Figures 1 or 2 we see that the only equilibrium with duopoly involves no consumers
becoming informed, in which case all consumers are charged the monopoly price and obtain no surplus.
However, with four suppliers, the maximum gap between VS and VN is greater than , and a stable
equilibrium with   0:975 emerges where all consumers obtain surplus (net of search cost where relevant)
of about 0:78: A contrasting e¤ect is discussed in Spiegler (2011, page 150): when a consumer is faced with
a greater number of suppliers, she may su¤er from choice overload, with the result that fewer consumers
are savvy.
15See Fershtman and Fishman (1994) and Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) for analysis of this issue.
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paid by the informed and uninformed consumers then quarter, and hence the incentive
to become informed is also quartered. The result is that there is no solution to (2), and
the only equilibrium involves all consumers remaining uninformed and sellers charging the
maximum permitted price, p = 1
4
. Each consumer now has outlay of 0.25 rather than
0.1, while industry prot increases about ve-fold increase with the new policy. Thus, the
perverse e¤ect of this policy on consumers can be substantial.16
So far, I have discussed how consumers can take the initiative to become savvy. Clearly,
though, sellers also play a role in supplying information to consumers, and there is a vast
literature about how seller advertise their product attributes and prices. Less familiar is
the possibility that sellers attempt to confuseconsumers, with the result that the fraction
of savvy types falls. For example, sellers might present their prices in an opaque way or in
a format di¤erent to their rivals, and this makes it hard for consumers to compare deals.17
To illustrate this possibility, consider the following extension to Varians model.18 There
are two sellers, and a seller can present its price in one of two formats. (A seller chooses its
price and its format simultaneously.) If sellers choose the same format, consumers nd it
easy to compare prices and all of them choose to buy from the seller with the lower price.
However, if sellers choose distinct formats a fraction 1   of consumers are confused and
buy randomly (while the remaining  are savvy enough to make an accurate comparison
16Knittel and Stango (2003) examine the credit card market in the United States in the period 197989,
during which usury laws in some states put a ceiling on permitted interest rates. In their Table 3 they show
how, for much of this period, average interest rates were higher in those states with a ceiling, and interpret
this as evidence that price caps can encourage tacit collusion via a policy-induced focal point. The (static)
search model presented in the text provides an alternative explanation for why a price cap might lead to
high prices, although the particular example discussed would look as if the sellers were coordinating on
the price cap.
17Several papers provide evidence of consumer confusion due to formatting problems. For instance,
Clerides and Courty (2013) observe empirically that the same brand of detergent is sold in two sizes, the
large size containing twice as much as the smaller. Sometimes the large size is more than twice as expensive
as the smaller, and yet signicant numbers of consumers still buy it. An example of a tari¤ which may be
di¢ cult for some consumers to compare with rival tari¤s is described in the Royal Mails handy guide
to its prices see www.royalmail.com/sites/default/les/RM_OurPrices_Dec2014.pdf [visited 26 January
2015]. This determines the price for delivering a parcel as a function of four physical characteristics (length,
width, depth and weight). For instance, a specic price applies for international delivery for a parcel with
Height + Width + Depth no greater than 90cm with no single side longer than 60cm, Weight up to 2kg.
18This discussion is based on Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013). Wilson
(2010) takes a di¤erent approach. In his model, two sellers compete to supply a homogenous product,
and each seller can choose the cost that consumers incur to discover its price. A fraction of consumers
can understand prices without cost, regardless of seller strategies, while the search cost of the remaining
consumers is a¤ected by obfuscation strategies. (All consumers can observe each sellers obfuscation
strategy from the start.) Wilson shows that in equilibrium one seller chooses a high search cost in order
to relax subsequent price competition.
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even across formats).
In this context, sellers choose both price and format according to a mixed strategy.
Since the format itself does not matter, only whether formats are the same or not, a seller
chooses the same CDF for its price, say F (p), regardless of its chosen format, and is equally
likely to choose either format. If a seller chooses a particular format and price p, then as
in expression (1) its expected prot is0@1
2
[1  F (p)]| {z }
same format
+ 1
2
[(1  F (p)) + 1
2
(1  )]| {z }
di¤erent format
1A (p)  1
4
(1  )(pM) :
Here, if the two sellers display their prices in the same format there is erce competition,
and the cheaper seller wins the whole market, while if the formats di¤er a fraction (1 ) of
consumers shop randomly. The right-hand side of the above represents the prot obtained
when a seller uses a di¤erent format and fully exploits its captive consumers, which is each
sellers equilibrium expected prot.
It is not an equilibrium in this model for sellers to choose their format deterministically.
Clearly, if both sellers chose the same format for sure, price would be driven down to cost
and prot to zero. In that case, a seller could switch format to make money from the
newly confused consumers. If sellers were known to choose distinct formats, prices would
be chosen according to a mixed strategy as in (1). However, in that case a seller could
switch to o¤er the same format as its rival and o¤er the lowest price in the price support,
which ensures it serves the entire market and boosts its prot.19
This model predicts that sellers engage in tari¤ di¤erentiation to obtain positive
prot, just as sellers in more traditional oligopoly models engage in product di¤erentiation.
However, unlike forms of product di¤erentiation, this tari¤di¤erentiation confers no welfare
gains. A consumer policy which forced rms to present prices in a common format would, in
this stylized model, lead to Bertrand price competition, and all consumers would benet.20
19Clearly, if sellers choose their format rst, and subsequently choose price, in this model the most
protable subgame-perfect equilibrium involves the two sellers choose di¤erent formats for sure, since
whenever they have the same format their prots will fall to zero.
20As discussed by Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013), additional issues arise
when the two formats are simpleand opaque, and when both sellers choose an opaque format even
more consumers are confused relative to when sellers choose distinct formats. In such a setting, when a
seller sets a low price it chooses a simple format to make it easy for customers to see its low price, but
with a high price it o¤ers an opaque format. Alternatively, it may be that when consumers nd it hard
to compare the sellerso¤ers they exit the market instead of buying randomly. If so, this could discipline
unregulated sellers to present their o¤ers in a comparable format. (See Crosetto and Gaudeul (2014) for
an experimental test of this possibility.)
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2.2 No externalities
Varians model of price dispersion can be extended so that sellers are able to charge dis-
tinct prices to savvy and non-savvy consumers. For example, the former group might be
those who use a price-comparison website and buy online, while the uninformed go to a
random bricks-and-mortar store, and a seller might set di¤erent prices for the two purchase
channels. When this form of price discrimination is used, the link between the two groups
is broken, and the outcome is that the informed consumers are o¤ered a low price equal to
marginal cost c, while the uninformed pay the monopoly price pM . In this case, there is
no search externality and the fraction of informed consumers has no impact on the surplus
enjoyed by a consumer of either type.21
Somewhat related is the possibility that sellers might each o¤er several tari¤s: savvy
consumers pick the lowest price from all tari¤s from all sellers, while non-savvy consumers
buy more randomly from the set of available tari¤s. If a seller o¤ers one cheap tari¤
alongside many expensive options, it is in e¤ect able to compete separately for the two
groups of consumers, with only the savvy consumers obtaining good deals.22
A less obvious way to eliminate the search externality is to place the workhorse model
of section 2.1 in a dynamic context, and to consider the impact of consumer savviness on
the sustainability of tacit collusion.23 Suppose the industry attempts to collude at the
monopoly price pM with the use of a trigger strategy. If a seller deviates by undercutting
pM , this is detected by all rivals, and from the next period onwards the industry plays the
one-shot Nash equilibrium with mixed strategies described above, yielding per-seller prot
in each period given by the right-hand side of (1). Crucially, if a seller does undercut the
collusive price, only the  savvy consumers can react. As a result, when  is the discount
21Baye and Morgan (2002) consider a model in which sellers must pay to list on a price comparison
website, and can charge di¤erent prices on this website and when they sell direct to consumers. They nd
that sellers choose whether to list, and their price on the comparison website, according to a mixed strategy
and choose their price on the comparison website according to a mixed strategy. Sellers obtain positive
prots there because of the possibility they are the sole listing seller. A sellers price on the comparison
website is lower than its price on its own platform.
22This is similar to the previous discussion about confusing tari¤s, except that here di¤erent customers
of the same seller can pay di¤erent prices for the product. Miravete (2013) documents when a seller o¤ers
a tari¤ which is dominated by other tari¤s it o¤ers which he terms foggy pricing in mobile telephony.
23See Schultz (2005) for this analysis, as well as its extension to a market with horizontally di¤erentiated
products. Petrikaite (2014) analyzes an alternative model in which consumers become informed about
prices and valuations by searching sequentially through their options. She nds that an increase in the
cost of search i.e., a reduction in market transparency usually makes collusion easier to achieve.
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factor, collusion at the monopoly price can be sustained if
1
1  
(pM)
n| {z }
collusive prot
 ( + 1  
n
)(pM)| {z }
deviation prot
+

1   (1  )
(pM)
n| {z }
punishment prot
which reduces to the familiar condition
  n  1
n
: (3)
In this market, an increase in  has two contrasting e¤ects. When  is large there is erce
competition without collusion, and so the punishment prot is low. On the other hand,
when  is large, the number of consumers who are able to respond to a price cut is large,
and so the short-run gains from deviating are large. These countervailing e¤ects precisely
cancel out, and the ability to collude is una¤ected by the number of savvy consumers. In
particular, when the discount factor is large enough that (3) holds, all consumers pay the
monopoly price pM , and savvy types cannot protect consumers from exploitation.
2.3 Ripo¤ externalities
In this section, I consider one natural way to reverse the search externality in a market
with price dispersion. In the workhorse model in section 2.1, price dispersion arose in
equilibrium because a seller had some consumers who were captive and some who were
able to shop around. This situation can also arise when all consumers see all prices but
some consumers only nd a single sellers product suitable. In this kind of market with
horizontal product di¤erentiation, sellers face a trade-o¤ between exploiting their captive
consumers and attracting those who like more than one sellers product. In this context,
suppose that non-savvy consumers are unable to discern which products are suitable for
them until after purchase. These consumers view products as perfect substitutes ex ante,
and so act to intensify price competition, to the benet of all consumers.24
In more detail, suppose that two symmetric sellers costlessly serve a market. With
probability , where 0 <  < 1, a consumer nds a given sellers product to be suitable,
24Anderson and Renault (2000) study a related model with costly sequential search, where there is
no price dispersion in equilibrium. Consumers have idiosyncratic tastes for the sellersproducts. Savvy
consumers know their tastes in advance, and travel to the seller with the preferred product rst, while
other consumers must travel to a seller to discover their match utility. (All consumers must travel to a
seller to discover its price.) Here, as in the model presented in the text, informed consumers have less
elastic demand and their presence boosts industry prots and harms other consumers.
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in which case she values its product at v. With probability 1    the product is unsuit-
able, in which case it is worthless to her. All consumers can see both sellersprices. A
fraction  of consumers are savvy in the sense that they can discern their match utility in
advance, and buy from the cheapest seller with a good match (if any). A fraction 1   
of consumers cannot judge the match quality until after they have purchased the product.
These consumers are rational and risk-neutral, and buy from the cheapest seller (if any)
with a price below the expected match quality, which is v. Of course, these non-savvy
consumers end up with a worthless product with probability 1  , and in this sense they
are ripped o¤. However, unlike the nal model in this paper, this feature is not due to
sellers engaging in any tactic which aims to exploit the non-savvy consumers.25
It is clear that any equilibrium involves sellers choosing price according to a mixed
strategy, and in the appendix I derive the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in this
market.26 There, we see that industry prot is
() = 2v(1  ) ; (4)
which increases with the fraction of savvy types, . I also show that, as  increases, a
sellers price weakly increases in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance. This implies
that a consumer of either type is better o¤ when the fraction of non-savvy types rises,
so that the rip-o¤ externality is present. In the case where v = 2 and  = 1
2
, VN() is
plotted as the lower solid curve on Figure 3, while VS() is plotted as the upper solid curve.
Aggregate consumer surplus, VS() + (1 )VN(), is plotted as the dashed curve, which
is also decreasing (except for  very close to 1).
Total welfare depends in a complicated way on  in this model, with two conicting
e¤ects: (i) increasing  implies that more consumers are able to choose a suitable product,
and (ii) decreasing  means that more consumers treat products as homogeneous, which
drives down prices and makes the non-savvy more likely to buy at all. (In the example
where v = 2 and  = 1
2
, a non-savvy consumer is never o¤ered a low enough price to
induce her to buy when  = 1.) Because of these two e¤ects, it is possible for welfare to
25One could extend this model so that sellers could choose their  parameter (say, where a larger 
requires a higher xed cost), in which case choosing a low  might be interpreted as an attempt to rip
o¤non-savvy consumers who cannot discern their match utility.
26The analysis is a little more involved than that for section 2.1, since the two groups of consumers have
di¤erent reservation prices: a savvy consumer is willing to pay up to v for a suitable product, while a
non-savvy consumer is willing to pay only v for any product. An implication of this is that the support
for prices might have a gap, and intermediate prices are never o¤ered by sellers.
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be non-monotonic with , although it is always maximized at  = 1, when all consumers
buy a product they like when one such product is available.
Note that the gap between VS and VN on Figure 3 is approximately 0.5 for all .
Consider an extension to this model where any consumer can choose to become informed
about their match utilities by incurring an ex ante cost of  = 0:1, say. A rational
consumer will therefore choose to be informed, regardless of how many others do so. When
all consumers choose to become informed, however, the gure shows they are worse o¤
compared to the situation where all remain ignorant. Here, the ripo¤ externality implies
that too many consumers choose to become informed.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
proportion of savvy types
surplus
Figure 3: Expected surplus for the two groups of consumers
A nal observation is that this model can be reinterpreted so that the roles of savvy
and non-savvy consumers are reversed. Suppose that marketing e¤orts by these sellers can
induce non-savvy consumers to view the two products as di¤erentiated (some of whom
then value the product more than it is really worth, and some of whom mistakenly view
it as worthless), while savvy consumers are immune to this marketing and correctly view
the products as perfect substitutes. With this reinterpretation, the search externality is
present and savvy consumers protect the non-savvy.
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3 Add-On Pricing and Aftermarkets
In this section I examine more complicated products than those discussed in section 2.
Specically, I discuss markets in which sellers supply an add-onproduct or service once
a consumer has purchased an initial coreproduct. Familiar examples of this phenomenon
include: the minibar inside a hotel room; toner cartridges once one has purchased a printer;
after-sales care for your new car; an extended warranty for your new television; renewing
an initial magazine subscription; a casual overdraft from your bank, or the ability to have
your luggage stowed in the aircrafts hold in the event it is deemed too large for the cabin.
In such markets, non-savvy consumers might downplay the importance of add-on terms,
or cannot easily observe or interpret such terms, when they decide on their supplier.
I focus on situations where a seller chooses its core and add-on prices at the same time,
and the issue is not one of lack of commitment to a future add-on price. Rather, some
consumers either do not observe the rms choice of add-on price, or can observe it but
do not think it will apply to them.27 Three variants are discussed in turn: one where
duopolists compete in a Hotelling market and must o¤er the same add-on terms to all
their customers; a second where potentially many sellers compete and naive consumers
do not foresee their demand for the add-on service, and a nal variant where non-savvy
consumers can be tricked into paying for add-ons they dont want. These model variants
are chosen to illustrate the three kinds of externality listed in section 1.
Although the following discussion is couched in terms of add-on pricing, it largely
applies also to markets where sellers choose the quality of an indivisible product, and
where only some consumers are able to discern quality before purchase. (Here, a low add-
on price corresponds to a high-quality product.) For instance, some consumers may not
know how to interpret exclusions in an insurance contract, or may mistakenly believe
that such exclusions will not be relevant to their circumstances.
3.1 Search externalities
Consider the following Hotelling duopoly model of add-on pricing. Two symmetric sellers,
denoted 1 and 2, compete to supply a product. These sellers are located at each end of the
unit interval [0; 1], and consumers are uniformly located on this interval. A seller o¤ers a
27Shapiro (1995) discusses four potential sources of market failure in aftermarkets, including lack of
ability to commit to future prices and the presence of consumers who are poorly informed or myopic about
future prices. My focus in this section is on the latter possibility.
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core product, and if a consumer buys its core product she is then able to buy an add-on
product from the same seller. All consumers want a single unit of the core product, and
if the price for the add-on product is p they will go on to purchase q(p) units of that
product.28 The net surplus to a consumer from the option of being able to buy the add-on
at price p is denoted s(p), the usual area under the demand curve:
s(p) 
Z 1
p
q(~p)d~p :
For technical reasons, suppose that q(p) is logconcave in p. Write (p)  (p   c)q(p) for
the add-on prot with price p, and pM for the price which maximizes this prot. (Since
q() is logconcave, () is single-peaked in p.) Each seller incurs unit cost for supplying the
core product and the add-on product equal respectively to C and c.
In this section, I assume that a seller must o¤er the same add-on price to all its cus-
tomers. Suppose that seller i = 1; 2 chooses price for the core product and its add-on
product equal respectively to Pi and pi. A consumer located at ` 2 [0; 1] obtains net
surplus
X   P1 + s(p1)  t`
if she buys from seller 1, where t > 0 is the transport costinvolved in travelling a unit
distance to the seller. (Here, X is each consumers value for the core product, and so her
total surplus from the core product at price P1 plus the option of being able to buy the
add-on at price p1 is X  P1 + s(p1).) Likewise, if this consumer buys from seller 2 her net
surplus is
X   P2 + s(p2)  t(1  `) :
To simplify the analysis, I assume that X is large enough that the market is covered, and
all consumers buy from one seller or the other (even if they foresee monopoly prices in the
add-on market).
All consumers observe both sellers core price. Suppose a fraction  of consumers
observe each sellers add-on price, while the remaining 1    consumers either cannot
observe, or do not consider, a sellers add-on price until after they have purchased their
28This elastic demand for the add-on service could be generated if each consumer has a unit demand
for the add-on with incremental valuation v, and the probability that v is above p is q(p). With this
interpretation, the realization of v is not known to the consumer (even a savvy consumer) until after she
buys the core product.
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core product, at which point they are locked into the same seller for the add-on. I assume
that whether a consumer is savvy is independent of her location `.
A particularly simple model to analyze has the 1  non-savvy consumers being strategi-
cally naive, in that they can observe each sellers add-on price but at the time they purchase
the core product they mistakenly believe they will have no demand for the add-on service.
These consumers therefore care only about core prices when choosing their initial supplier,
while savvy consumers care about the lifetimecost of the product they purchase.
In more detail, a sellers total prot if it chooses the price pair (P; p), while its rival
chooses the equilibrium price pair (P ; p) is


1
2
+
[s(p)  P ]  [s(p)  P ]
2t

+ (1  )

1
2
+
P    P
2t

 [P   C + (p)] : (5)
To understand this expression, note that [P  C+(p)] is the sellers total prot from each
of its customers, which consists of prot from the core product, P  C, plus the prot from
the add-on, (p). The non-savvy do not react to changes in the add-on price, but do react
to deviations in the core price P . Given that ` is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and all
consumers are served, the fraction of non-savvy consumers who prefer this sellers o¤er is 
1
2
+ P
 P
2t

. Savvy consumers react to deviations in both prices, which explains the extra
term s(p)  s(p) in the corresponding expression for their demand.
For prices (P ; p) to constitute an equilibrium, choosing (P; p) = (P ; p) should max-
imize (5) over any pair of prices (P; p). The rst-order conditions for this problem are
P    C + (p) = t (6)
and 0(p) + s0(p) = 0 or
(1  )q(p) + (p   c)q0(p) = 0 : (7)
Since q() is logconcave, there is a unique solution to (7) and hence to (6). It is harder to
check whether the second-order condition for maximizing (5) is satised, but in standard
examples this appears not to be an issue.29 Note that the add-on price in (7) does not
depend on di¤erentiation parameter t, indicating that market power in the add-on market
in this model depends on the extent of consumer myopia rather than horizontal product
di¤erentiation.
29For instance, if q(p) = 1  p and C = c = 0, the second-order condition is satised for all  and t.
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Expression (6) implies that industry prot in equilibrium, P    C + (p), does not
depend on the fraction of savvy types, . This is a common feature in Hotelling models
with full coverage, although, as we will see shortly, the corresponding model with rational
consumers has prot which does depend on . However,  does a¤ect how that prot is
generated, as can be seen in expression (7). In particular, when  = 1, the add-on price is
at its e¢ cient level p = c, while when  = 0 the add-on price is the monopoly price pM
which maximizes (p). In the latter case, although a seller makes high prot (pM) in the
add-on market, this anticipated prot makes it keen to attract customers with a low core
product price, and the net impact on prot is the same as when all consumers are savvy.
More generally, formula (7) implies that the add-on price decreases monotonically from the
monopoly to the e¢ cient level as  increases from 0 to 1. For example, when q(p) = 1  p
and c = 0, the add-on price is p = 1 
2  .
Total welfare rises when the add-on price moves closer to its e¢ cient level, i.e., when
 is higher, and since prot is una¤ected we deduce that aggregate consumer surplus,
V () = VN() = VS(), also rises with . Even if a consumer nds it prohibitively costly
to discover the add-on price, when enough others do check these terms she is still able to
obtain a reasonable deal. Thus, savvy types help to protect the non-savvy and this market
exhibits search externalities.30
A natural question to ask is how this analysis is a¤ected if the 1  non-savvy consumers
cannot observe or interpret the add-on price but are rational instead of naive, and correctly
forecast their own future demand for the add-on service as well as a sellers incentive to
choose its add-on price. When rational consumers see one dimension of a sellers choice but
not another, the issue arises of how the consumer forms her expectation of the unobserved
variable given what she does observe. Here, I suppose that if a seller o¤ers a particular
core price (not necessarily the equilibrium price), the uninformed consumer calculates the
sellers most protable choice of add-on price given its core price, and chooses whether to
buy from the seller accordingly.31
30As Shapiro (1995, page 493) puts it: Poorly informed buyers may be protected by informed buyers,
whose presence forces sellers to compete on a [total cost of ownership] basis and penalizes sellers with high
aftermarket charges, especially since it may be di¢ cult for sellers to identify the poorly informed buyers
so as to price discriminate against them.
31These are known as wary beliefs, following McAfee and Schwartz (1994). By contrast, passive
beliefs involve a consumers anticipated add-on price not depending on the sellers choice of core price.
Passive beliefs are perhaps less plausible in this context, since if a seller deviates in its core price and
rational-but-uninformed consumers do not change their beliefs about the add-one price, the seller in fact
has an incentive to deviate in both prices. Nevertheless, it is considerably easier to solve models with
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When  = 0 or  = 1 the outcome is exactly as the previous model with naive con-
sumers, and in particular the industry prot is t in either of the extreme cases.32 In a
mixed market with 0 <  < 1, though, the two models di¤er, and consumer beliefs about
the unobserved add-on price play an important role. In fact, when some savvy consumers
are present, an rational-but-uninformed consumer anticipates that a seller with an unex-
pectedly low core price has set a higher add-on charge: when its core price is lower, the
seller has less incentive to attract more custom from the savvy consumers with a low add-
on price, and hence nds it protable to set a higher add-on charge. This implies that a
sellers demand is less elastic with respect to its core price than would be the case in a
situation where all consumers were informed or all were uninformed and competition is
less intense.33 It follows that industry prot is higher in a mixed market than in a market
with  = 0 or  = 1. For the same reason, consumers are worse o¤ with intermediate 
than at the two extremes, so that V = VN = VS is U-shaped. Thus, consumers might
be made better or worse o¤ as  is boosted i.e., there might be a search or a ripo¤
externality depending on the initial proportion of savvy types.
 = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
p 0.50 0.42 0.29 0.12 0.00
P  0.75 0.83 0.96 1.05 1.00
P    s(p) 0.625 0.66 0.71 0.66 0.50
 1.00 1.08 1.17 1.16 1.00
Table 1: Outcomes in example with q(p) = 1  p, C = c = 0 and t = 1
Solving this model is relatively complex, and I leave the details of the analysis to the
appendix. Table 1 presents the outcome in an example where q(p) = 1  p, C = c = 0 and
t = 1. As can be seen, the equilibrium add-on price falls monotonically with , starting
passive than wary beliefs. (In this context, if the rational consumers had passive beliefs, the outcome is
exactly as just described in the Hotelling model with naive consumers.)
32Ellison (2005) presents an alternative Hotelling model of add-on pricing, where consumers vary in
both their the transport cost parameter t and their value for the add-on product. (Consumers with higher
value for the add-on have stronger brand preferences.) He analyzes two games: one where the two rms
reveal both of their prices ex ante and another where neither rm reveals its add-on price until consumers
buy the core product. Using the current notation, these two cases correspond to situations with  = 1
and  = 0 respectively. In his model, industry prots are higher when no consumer is informed of add-on
prices, in contrast to the model presented in the text.
33Scitovsky (1950, page 50) makes this point long ago: the ignorant buyers habit of judging quality by
price weakens [...] price competition. [...] In such markets a price change will lead few buyers to transfer
their customer from one producer to another. Hence, the price elasticity of demand will be low in such
markets.
20
at the monopoly price pM when  = 0 and ending at the e¢ cient price when  = 1. The
total price, P    s(p), which is inversely related to consumer surplus, is hump-shaped
in , as is industry prot. Prot is the same at the two extremes  = 0; 1, but is higher in
a mixed population.
The ripo¤ externality is present when  is small since when no consumers see the add-
on price, they anticipate monopoly terms for sure and react sensitively to changes in a
sellers core price. When some savvy consumers are introduced to the market, though, this
induces rational-but-uninformed consumers to infer a high add-on price when they observe
a low core price, and makes their demand less elastic and allows sellers to raise their core
prices. Nevertheless, when only few non-savvy types are present, they are well protected
in their purchases by the presence of savvy, well-informed buyers.
3.2 No externalities
An important reason why there was a search externality in the previous section is that
consumers were assumed to be locked into their initial seller for the supply of the add-on
service. If an undi¤erentiated add-on service was available from all sellers, competition for
the core product is una¤ected by prot in the aftermarket (which is zero), and there are
no externalities across consumers.34
Another important reason for the search externality was the assumption that a seller
had to o¤er the same add-on terms to all its customers, which seems reasonable in many
contexts. (It is hard to imagine a hotel supplying rooms with di¤erent minibar prices, for
instance.) In other situations, though, it may be feasible and protable for sellers to o¤er
distinct contracts aimed at the two groups of consumers.
To consider this second point in more detail, consider a situation in which non-savvy
types do not anticipate their future demand for the add-on service. These consumers
might observe the add-on price, but do not regard it as relevant to them. In the previous
Hotelling model, suppose now that a seller can o¤er two contracts, and seller i = 1; 2 o¤ers
a price pair (P Si ; p
S
i ) aimed at the savvy type and the price pair (P
N
i ; p
N
i ) aimed at the
naive. Suppose, hypothetically, that sellers can actually observe directly whether or not a
consumer is savvy or naive, and can condition their tari¤ on the consumer type. (We will
34For example, some people may underestimate the costs of owning a dog (in terms of dog food, say),
while others accurately forecast such costs. If the market for dog food is competitive, the price for a dog is
not subsidized by aftermarket prots, and does not depend on the fraction of savvy types in the market.
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see shortly that consumers will voluntarily choose the contract aimed at them, and so the
implausible assumption that savviness is observable is not needed.)
It is easy to see that the equilibrium contract aimed at the savvy types is as in (6)(7)
with  = 1, so that
P S = C + t ; pS = c ; (8)
while the contract aimed at the naive corresponds to the case with  = 0, so that
PN = C + t  (pM) ; pN = pM : (9)
Thus, savvy types are o¤ered a cost-reective tari¤, while naive types are o¤ered a bar-
gaincore price but end up paying monopoly prices for the add-on once they realize they
need or want this service. Ex ante, a naive consumer does not prefer the savvy contract,
since the latter contract involves a higher core product price, and these consumers only
care about that price at the time they choose seller. In addition, a savvy consumer does
not prefer the bargain-then-ripo¤contract aimed at the naive.35 Thus, each consumer
chooses the appropriate contract, and sellers do not need to observe savviness directly to
discriminate between consumers. This model predicts, for instance, that a seller of cars
might o¤er a menu of contracts to its customers: a bargain price for the car only, without
aftercare services bundled in (which would then be expensive), aimed at naive consumers
who do not foresee the importance of aftercare, and a bundled contract for the car plus
specied aftercare, aimed at savvy consumers who care about the lifetime costs of the
product.
There is therefore price dispersion in the market, both for the core product and for
the add-on. The pair of contracts (8)(9) does not depend on the proportion of savvy
types, , and so there are no externalities between the two groups. In particular, the
search externality found in section 3.1 was contingent on an assumption that the duopolists
o¤ered the same contract to all their customers.
Additional e¤ects emerge in a modied model in which market participation is elas-
tic rather than xed as in the Hotelling framework. To that end, consider a perfectly
competitive market with several identical sellers supplying an undi¤erentiated product.36
35Ignoring transport costs, a savvy consumers net surplus with the savvy contract is s(c)   (C + t),
while her net surplus with the naive contract is s(pM )   (C + t   (pM )), and the latter is smaller since
add-on welfare s() + () is maximized at p = c.
36We can think of sellers each o¤ering a menu of contracts, or separate sellers each o¤ering a single
contract. In the latter case we require at least four sellers, so that there are at least two sellers which o¤er
savvy contracts and two which o¤er naive contracts.
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Consumers di¤er in their valuation for the core product, X, and the fraction of consumers
with X  P is denoted Q(P ). Regardless of their valuation, X, all consumers will have
the same add-on demand q(p). Savvy consumers buy the product if their lifetime utility
exceeds the core products price, i.e., if X + s(p)  P . There are two natural ways to
model the naive consumerspurchase decision.37
Case 1: Hidden costs. Here, naive consumers do not realize they need the add-on service,
and when they buy the core product they in e¤ect think the complementary product comes
for free. For example, (very) naive consumers may not realize that toner cartridges are
needed to use a printer, and so buy a printer assuming they can print as much as they
wish without further outlay, or an inexperienced driver does not anticipate that adequate
servicing in required to keep her car on the road. These consumers behave as if the add-on
price will be zero, and so buy the core product if X + s(0)  P ; they over-estimate the
combined benet of the core and add-on product and purchase too often.
Case 2: Hidden benets. Naive consumers do not realize they will gain any benet from
the add-on service until after they buy the core product. For example, a naive consumer
when choosing a hotel room overlooks the benets of having the minibar in the room. The
consumers behave as if the add-on price will be innite, and so buy the core product if
X  P ; they under-estimate the combined benet of the system and purchase too rarely.
In either case, once they have purchased the core product, a naive consumer goes on
to generate prot (p) for the seller. Similarly to the contracts (8)(9), the equilibrium
contracts take the form whereby savvy consumers have the e¢ cient contract (P; p) = (C; c)
while naive consumers have bargain-then-ripo¤contract with a monopoly add-on price
pM and a subsidized core product price which just enables a seller to break even, so that
P  C + (pM) = 0. As before, consumers have no incentive to choose the contract aimed
at the other type, and this pair of contracts does not depend on the fraction of savvy types
present in the market.
This model predicts that naive consumers end up paying high add-on prices. As such,
regulators might consider controlling a sellers freedom to exploit naive consumers in this
fashion.38 (Such regulation has no impact on the surplus enjoyed by savvy consumers.)
With the situation in case 1 above, a policy which forces sells to set p = c, say, will benet
37This distinction did not matter with the previous Hotelling model, since naive consumers purchased
from one seller or the other regardless of their anticipated surplus from the aftermarket.
38See Grubb (2015b) for an account of policy interventions when consumers have biased beliefs.
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the naive consumers: it improves their surplus in the aftermarket, and the resulting price
rise for the core product mitigates their problem of purchasing the combined system too
frequently. However, with case 2 the two market failures in the laissez-faire market work
against each other naive consumers pay too much for the add-on, and they buy the core
product too rarely and while high add-on prices are the cause of the rst problem they
mitigate the second by funding a subsidized core product price. As such, controlling the
maximum permitted add-on price need not benet these naive consumers.
There are other situations where the presence of savvy consumers has no signicant
impact on the deals o¤ered to the naive, and vice versa. For example, some consumers
might not believe in the predictive power of horoscopes and ignore this market altogether,
while others are willing to pay for this service. (We can remain neutral about who are the
savvy here.) Unless there are strong scale economy e¤ects (so that having large numbers
of customers allows astrologers to operate more e¢ ciently), there is no interaction between
the two groups of consumers. More generally, many scamsprey on the naive but have
little impact on the savvy.
The phenomenon can also be seen in competitive insurance markets where some con-
sumers are over-optimistic (or over-pessimistic) about the likelihood of the bad outcome.39
Similarly, lenders may o¤er distinct contracts to entrepreneurs who are realistic or who
are over-optimistic about their prospects.40 Alternatively, naive consumers might be over-
optimistic about how often they will go to an exercise gym. Such consumers may prefer a
lump-sum membership, which is wrongly perceived to be good valueby the optimistic
consumer. A savvy consumer who accurately estimates her demand prefer a pay-per-visit
contract, and neither type of consumer wishes to use the tari¤ aimed at the other type.
Similar e¤ects arise in situations where all consumers have self-control problems, and savvy
consumers foresee this in advance while naive consumers do not.41
These various situations all share the same basic structure. The market is competitive,
and so industry prot is zero. All consumers ultimately exhibit the same behaviour and
impose the same costs on their supplier when faced with a given contract, and so the set
of contracts which are consistent with zero prot is the same for a naive as for a savvy
consumer. From this set, sellers in equilibrium choose the contract which is most attractive
39See Sandroni and Squintani (2007) for a model along these lines.
40See Landier and Thesmar (2009).
41See DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) and Spiegler (2011, section 2.3) for further discussion.
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ex ante to the target consumer, and so by construction, neither type is tempted by the
contract aimed at the other group. The outcome is as if a consumers savviness or naivete
was known to sellers, and there is no interaction between the two groups.
3.3 Ripo¤ externalities
The nal model is another model with hidden costs for naive consumers. Here, naive
consumers mistakenly buy an add-on service which no one particularly wants or needs,
while savvy can avoid the add-on costs. In this situation, the core price is subsidized with
the prot generated by the fraction of naive consumers who end up paying for unwanted
add-ons, and this benets the savvy consumers who only pay the core price.42
Examples of the kind of add-on serviceI have in mind are as follows. Some airlines
charge for carrying excess luggage, for checking-in luggage, or for checking in at the airport
rather than online.43 Savvy consumers are aware that these charges will be levied unless
they take care in advance, while naive consumers will pay these charges if they turn up
at the airport unprepared. Similarly, banks or credit card companies levy charges for
unauthorized overdrafts or late payment. By being aware of their nances, savvy consumers
can avoid these charges, while naive consumers might not be aware of the circumstances
in which these charges can be levied.44 Mobile phone contracts usually allow a specied
number of calls per month, but if the subscriber makes more calls than this she pays an
overagecharge. Naive consumers who do not pay attention to their monthly usage or
the possibility that they may need more than the monthly allowance may get caught out
42Gabaix and Laibson (2006) is perhaps the rst and most prominent paper which discusses this phe-
nomenon. Their approach di¤ers slightly from that presented here. They suppose that a seller decides
whether to advertise or to shroud its add-on price. When a seller advertises its price, this acts as an
eye-opener and consumers realize they will have to pay the charge unless they take evasive action in
advance. If sellers decide to shroud, they will choose monopolistic terms for the add-on. Savvy consumers
anticipate this incentive, and take evasive action, while naive types do not. In many cases, an equilibrium
exists in which all sellers shroud their add-on price, and naive consumers end up paying it. See Köszegi
(2015, section 6) for a detailed survey of models of this sort.
43At the time of writing, Ryanair charges £ 70 to check in at the airport. See www.ryanair.com/en/fees
for details (visited 21 May, 2014).
44Armstrong and Vickers (2012) discuss unauthorized overdraft fees in the UK. In the UK bank market
only a minority of consumers pay such fees (which were an average of £ 23 per item in 2006), and these
fees help fund the free if in creditmodel enjoyed by the majority of other consumers. (In 2006, about
30% of current account revenue came from these charges.) About 75% of account holders did not pay
these fees, while 1.4 million customers paid more than £ 500 in such fees in 2006. The great majority of
customers say they do not consider the level of these charges when choosing their bank, and few of those
who paid these charges in 2006 anticipated beforehand having to pay them.
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in a contract with high overage charges.45
Similar e¤ects are seen in other scenarios. For instance, naive consumers might be
susceptible to persuasion to buy a useless add-on. When a consumer buys a new television,
a salesman may suggest she also buys an extended warranty to go with it. If the television
is so reliable that the warranty actually has no value, the cost of the warranty is pure loss to
the consumer and pure prot to the seller. Savvy consumers are immune to the salesmans
patter and do not buy. Alternatively, practices such as teaserrates and roll-over contracts
can be interpreted in a similar manner. Suppose that sellers supply a product over time,
and the price for the rst periods consumption is lower than for subsequent consumption.
A savvy consumer might cancel her contract after one period (and perhaps enjoy another
teaser rate from the next seller), while a naive consumer forgets to cancel or is unaware
that her contract will automatically be rolled-over into the next period. This analysis is
consistent with marketing tactics such as a bank o¤ering a relatively high interest rate
on a savings account for the rst year, which drops o¤ sharply thereafter, or a magazine
o¤ering a cheap trial period.46
To model these situations, consider the following stylized framework. Two or more
sellers supply a product, the cost of which is C and the price of which is P . A fraction  of
consumers are savvy and pay only this price P . The remaining 1   consumers are naive,
and can be tricked into making an exogenous extra payment R > 0 to their chosen seller
once they have purchased the product. This extra payment might be generated via small-
print traps or worthless add-ons, which savvy consumers know how to avoid without
cost. If sellers cannot distinguish the two kinds of consumers in advance, the equilibrium
outcome in this market is for the product to be subsidized by the anticipated rents from
the naive, so that
P = C   (1  )R : (10)
A savvy consumer pays only this bargain price, while a naive consumer pays the bargain
price followed by the ripo¤ R, which comes to C + R in total. Thus, both types of
consumer pay more when  is larger. A seller makes positive prot, equal to R, from
each non-savvy customer, but makes a loss (1   )R from each savvy customer, and on
45See Grubb (2015a) for analysis of this form of bill shock, and the possible interventions to overcome
the problem.
46Even the consumer rights body in the UK, Which?, employs this tactic. One can sign up for one
months service for just £ 1, which is automatically rolled-over for £ 10.75 each month until cancelled. See
www.which.co.uk/signup for further details (visited 21 May 2014).
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average it just breaks even.
As before, a consumer has idiosyncratic valuation X for the product, Q(P ) is the
proportion of consumers with X  P and S(P )  R
P
Q measures consumer surplus from
the product (without ripo¤s) when price is P . The average surplus of a savvy consumer in
this market is then VS() = S(C   (1  )R), which decreases with . The (true) surplus
of a naive consumer is
VN() = S(C   (1  )R) RQ(C   (1  )R)
since a naive consumer buys just as often as a savvy type, but ends up paying an extra R
if she does buy. (Here, it is possible that VN is negative.) It is ambiguous whether or not
VN decreases with . However, if R is not too large or demand Q is not too elastic, VN
will, like VS, decrease with  so that a ripo¤ externality is present. Aggregate consumer
surplus, V () = VS() + (1   )VN(), which equals total welfare in this competitive
market, unambiguously increases with  due to the larger number of consumers who enjoy
the higher surplus VS.
Aggregate consumer surplus V () always falls with R, and so there is scope for welfare-
improving regulation which constrains the size of the ripo¤ R. However, the impact of
such regulation on the two groups of consumers di¤ers: a savvy type benets from a
sellers ability to rip o¤ the naive and so would like R to remain large, while a naive
consumers surplus VN decreases with R. As such, the two groups have opposing interests
towards regulation to limit ripo¤s, and savvy types who might (as in footnote 44) be in
the majority have an incentive to lobby against this welfare-enhancing regulation.47
Finally, it may be possible for sellers to observe, or learn about, a consumers savviness,
and set prices accordingly. For instance, banks or credit card companies may have infor-
mation about a consumers propensity to pay penalty fees. In this case, if banks can set
personalized prices to di¤erent consumers, they would charge more for their core service
to savvy consumers who avoid extra fees than to those consumers who are known to pay
47If R is large enough, the price in (10) is negative. If a negative price is not feasible, the outcome is
then that the product is o¤ered for free, and the rms costs are covered entirely by exploiting the naive.
(For instance, in the UK a bank account is typically free.) Sellers are then less able to dissipate prots,
and prots may be positive even in a competitive market. In these cases, sellers as well as savvy consumers
have an incentive to lobby against constraints on ripo¤s. However, in the credit card and banking contexts,
it may be possible for sellers to in e¤ect set a negative price for their product. For example, cashback
contracts (where a consumer is paid by her credit card for each transaction) or current accounts which
pay interest to customers have this avour.
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them more frequently. This possibility reduces the linkage between the two groups, and in
the limit externalities are eliminated as in sections 2.2 and 3.2.
4 Conclusions
This paper has explored how the balance of savvy and non-savvy consumers in a
market a¤ects the deals which sellers o¤er their customers. I discussed three ways in which
the two groups might interact: the case of search externalities, where savvy consumers
help all consumers obtain a good deal; the case of ripo¤ externalities, where non-savvy
consumers facilitate good deals for all consumers, and the case without interactions between
the two groups.
I restricted attention to two broad kinds of market: those which exhibit price dispersion
(section 2) and those involving forms of add-on pricing (section 3). The classical model of
price dispersion in section 2.1 provided an instance of the search externality. There, savvy
consumers shopped around for the lowest price and their demand was more elastic. As
such, savvy consumers induced lower prices in equilibrium, so that industry prot fell with
, the fraction of savvy types, while overall welfare increased. Because prot falls when
more consumers are savvy, sellers have an incentive to try to confuse consumers in the way
they present their o¤ers, and they may welcome regulation which reduces the incentive for
consumers to become savvy.
At the other extreme was the model of bill shock in section 3.3, where non-savvy
consumers could be tricked into making extra payments. Competing sellers set the price
for their product in anticipation that a consumer might be a naive type and generate
extra revenue. As such, the equilibrium price for the product was subsidized, with a
greater subsidy when the fraction of non-savvy types was larger. In many cases, both
types of consumers benet from the presence of the naive, and a ripo¤ externality was
present. Overall welfare decreases with the ability to exploit naive consumers. Regulation
to constrain ripo¤s may therefore be e¢ cient, but may be resisted by savvy types who prey
on the naive consumers when they stumble into small-print traps.
The framework followed in this paper can be applied to several other kinds of markets,
and to conclude I list four further applications. First, a likely example of a market in
which non-savvy consumers might help all consumers is Akerlof (1970)s lemons market,
where savvy consumers who understand adverse selection can cause the market to shut
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down. Strategically naive consumers, however, who mistakenly believe the pool of products
o¤ered for sale is una¤ected by the selling price and who may therefore pay more than
the product is really worth to them can allow the market to function.48
Second, consider a simple model of hold-up along the lines of Diamond (1971)s paradox.
Suppose a single rm supplies an indivisible product and all consumers must incur a sunk
cost to travel to the seller to discover its price. If all consumers knew their idiosyncratic
value for the item in advance, and anticipate the rms incentive to set its price, this
market would break down entirely. (The rm always has an incentive to raise its price a
little above any price anticipated by consumers, since a consumer travels to the seller if
her value is greater than the price plus the travel cost, and so no equilibrium exists where
some consumers travel to the rm.) However, if some non-savvy consumers do not know
their value for the item until they travel to the seller, this can enable the market to open,
to the benet of all consumers.49
Consider next examples of markets which plausibly exhibit a search externality. First,
savvy consumers may be less willing to pay a brand premium when the underlying product
quality does not justify this. For instance, Bronnenberg, Dubé, Gentzkow, and Shapiro
(2015) document how doctors are less likely than the average consumer to buy brand-
name headache remedies, which may be much more expensive than a pharmacys generic
equivalent. (They nd that only 9% of doctors buy a branded product over the generic,
chemically identical, substitutes, while 26% of other consumers do so.) In a calibrated
model, the authors suggest that brand-name prices would fall if more consumers behaved
like doctors, and this would benet all consumers in the market.
Finally, consider the durable goods problem of Coase (1972), where a single rm sells
its product over time to forward-looking consumers with heterogeneous tastes for its prod-
uct. The rm cannot commit to its future prices, and after high-value consumers have
purchased, the rm has an incentive to reduce its price to sell to remaining lower-value
consumers. This model can be viewed as an oligopoly market where the rm competes
with itselfover time with inter-temporal price dispersion. The model can be extended so
that some consumers are naive, in that they do not foresee the sellers incentive to reduce
its price over time. As such, these naive consumers buy myopically, as soon as the price
48See Spiegler (2011, section 8.3) and the references listed there for further discussion of markets when
consumers have limited understanding of adverse selection.
49See Anderson and Renault (2006) for a model which makes use of this insight.
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falls below their valuation for the item. These naive consumers are like the inert shoppers
in Varians model (who can be interpreted as mistakenly believing that all rms o¤er the
same price). The presence of these consumers tends to relax intra-rm competition in
Coases model, just as they relax inter-rm competition in Varians model, and so this
market is likely to involve a search externality.
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Technical Appendix
Details for the model presented in section 2.3: Depending on the proportion of savvy
consumers, there are two kinds of equilibria to consider: those where sellers only ever serve
the savvy consumers, and those where sellers sometimes serve non-savvy consumers.50
First, we look for an equilibrium with price support [pmin; v], where pmin > v so that
non-savvy consumers never participate in the market. The equilibrium prot for a seller
is then v(1 ). If a seller deviated and instead set the lower price p = v it would sell
to 1    +  consumers, and so obtain prot v[1    + ]. For this deviation to be
unprotable we require v(1  )  v[1   + ], or
(1  )  1
2
: (11)
If  > 1
2
this inequality is never satised, while if   1
2
it is satised if and only if  is
large enough. The CDF for a sellers mixed strategy for price, F , satises
 [1   + (1  F (p))] p  v(1  ) ; (12)
so that F does not depend on . The minimum price in the support is therefore given by
pmin = (1  )v ;
50There is no equilibrium where sellers always serve the uninformed, and so set price no higher than
v. To see this, suppose such an equilibrium did exist. If so, the maximum price chosen in equilibrium is
v, and equilibrium prot for a seller is 2v(1   ), which is its prot from a savvy consumer who has
a good match with it but not with its rival. If instead this seller set price p = v it would sell to the same
consumers, but make more prot. We deduce there is no such equilibrium.
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which from (11) is indeed greater than v as required.
Next, look for an equilibrium where the minimum price satises pmin < v, so that
non-savvy consumers are sometimes served. In this case, the price support will consist of
two disjoint segments, with a gap in between, so that the price support takes the form
[pmin; v] [ [p; v] where p > v.51 Again, a seller obtains equilibrium prot v(1  ),
and so pmin satises
[1   + ] pmin = v(1  )
which indeed implies that pmin  v when (11) does not hold. Let F (p) denote the CDF
for each sellers mixed strategy for choosing price. In the higher segment [p; v] we again
have F satisfying (12). In the lower segment [pmin; v] we have
[(1  ) + (2 + 1  )(1  F (p))]p = v(1  ) : (13)
For a seller to be indi¤erent between choosing price p = p and p = v, we require
[(1  ) + (2 + 1  )(1  F (p))]v = v(1  ) ;
so that the probability a seller caters only to the savvy, 1  F (p), satises
1  F (p) = (1  )
2
1  (1  2) :
(Note that 1   F (p) = 1 when (11) just binds.) It follows from (12) that the price p
satises 
1   +  (1  )
2
1  (1  2)

p = v(1  )
or
p =
1   + 2
1   +  v
which is always greater than v. Note that p decreases with . This completes the
derivation of the equilibrium. Regardless of whether condition (11) holds, industry prot
is given by expression (4) in the text.
In this equilibrium, a sellers price weakly increases with  in the sense of rst-order
stochastic dominance. For instance, if (11) holds, F does not depend on , while if (11)
does not hold one can check that F in (13) decreases with . Because of this, a consumer
51A sellers demand jumps at the point p = v, since for a price below v a seller serves all non-savvy
consumers when its rival sets price above v. The gap in the support is needed so that a seller can be
indi¤erent between all prices in the support.
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of either type is better o¤when  falls. Consider the particular case with  = 1
2
and v = 2
in more detail. Here, condition (11) never holds, and the non-savvy always have a chance
to purchase. The following gures depict the equilibrium price density when  = 1
3
and
 = 2
3
respectively, and shows how increasing  induces sellers to set higher prices.
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Figure 4: The impact of increasing  on the density for prices
The expected surplus of a non-savvy consumer is
VN() =
Z v
pmin
(v   p)dFmin(p) =
Z v
pmin
Fmin(p)dp =
Z v
pmin
(1  (1  F (p))2)dp :
Here, Fmin(p) is the CDF for the minimum of the two prices, which equals 1  (1 F (p))2.
In the example where v = 2 and  = 1
2
, we have pmin = 2  and (13) implies that in the
range [pmin; 1] we have 1  F (p) = 4 3 (2p   1), and the resulting VN() above is depicted
as the lower solid curve on Figure 3 in the text.
If condition (11) holds, total welfare is W () = v(1  (1 )2), while if (11) does not
hold the non-savvy sometimes buy and welfare is thenW () = (1 )v (1  (1  F (p))2)+
v(1   (1   )2). In the example where v = 2 and  = 1
2
, the latter case applies and
1   F (p) = 
4 3 . Aggregate consumer surplus, V (), is equal to W ()   (), and in
Figure 3 this is plotted as the dashed curve. Finally, savvy surplus VS can be obtained
from the formula VS() + (1  )VN() = V (), and is plotted as the higher solid curve
on Figure 3.
Details for the model presented in section 3.1: Given , suppose that (P ; p) is the equi-
librium price pair in this market, and write U = s(p)  P  for consumer surplus gross of
transport costs in this equilibrium. Suppose one seller considers choosing the price pair
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(P; p), while its rival plays the equilibrium strategy (P ; p). Savvy consumers see both of
this sellers prices, and so the fraction who buy from it is
1
2
+
s(p)  P   U
2t
:
Non-savvy consumers do not observe p, and form rational expectations about this price
given P . Suppose they anticipate add-on price p^, in which case the fraction of non-savvy
who buy from the seller is
1
2
+
s(p^)  P   U
2t
:
Similarly to expression (5), the sellers total prot from the two groups is therefore


1
2
+
s(p)  P   U
2t

+ (1  )

1
2
+
s(p^)  P   U
2t

 [P   C + (p)] : (14)
Given P and p^, the seller chooses its add-on price p to maximize this prot. (The seller
will never choose an add-on price above the monopoly price pM in problem (14), regardless
of consumer beliefs p^.) For the non-savvy consumers to have rational expectations about
the add-on price, we require that choosing p = p^ maximizes prot in (14). This implies
that the equilibrium add-on price given P satises the rst-order condition
(t+ s(p)  P   U)0(p)  q(p)(P   C + (p)) = 0 : (15)
Given equilibrium surplus U , expression (15) characterizes the relationship (even o¤ the
equilibrium path) between a sellers core price and its rationally anticipated add-on price.
Note that if  = 0, the equilibrium add-on price satises 0(p) = 0, so that p = pM
regardless of the core price P and the equilibrium add-on price is p = pM . At the other
extreme, if  = 1 the outcome as discussed in the text involves p = c, P  = C + t and
U = s(p)  P , which satises (15).
Expression (15) can be written as
(1  (p))(t+ s(p)  P   U) = (P   C + (p)) ; (16)
where (p)   pq0(p)=q(p) is the elasticity of add-on demand (which is increasing given
that q is logconcave). Since  is increasing, the left-hand side of (16) is decreasing with p
(at least in the range c  p  pM), while the right-hand side is increasing. Thus, there
is a unique price p which solves (16). Since the left-hand side of (16) decreases with P ,
while the right-hand side is increasing with P , it follows that the equilibrium add-on price
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p is a decreasing function of P . Intuitively, when the seller undercuts the equilibrium core
price, this reduces its incentive to gain market share from the savvy consumers with a low
add-on price. This is the crucial insight which reveals why the market is less competitive
when sellers face a mixed population of consumers.
If  > 0, from (15) we can write the core price P which implements a given add-on
price p as
P (p) =
0(p)(t+ s(p)  U) + q(p)(C   (p))
0(p) + q(p)
: (17)
The seller then chooses its add-on price p and associated core price P (p) to maximize its
prot 
1
2
+
s(p)  P (p)  U
2t

 [P (p)  C + (p)] : (18)
The remaining condition is to ensure that U in (17)(18) is the equilibrium level of consumer
surplus, i.e., that U = s(p) P . In sum, (P ; p) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium if:
(i) pmaximizes (18), where P (p) is dened in (17);
(ii) P  = P (p), and
(iii) U = s(p)  P .
It is hard to make further progress at this level of generality, and so I illustrate the
analysis with the example where q(p) = 1   p and C = c = 0, so that s(p) = 1
2
(1   p)2,
(p) = p(1  p) and pM = 1
2
. Expression (17) then implies
P (p) =
(1  2p)(t+ 1
2
(1  p)2   U)  p(1  p)2
1  2p+ (1  p) :
Substituting this into prot (18) shows that the sellers prot with add-on price p is
1
8t
 (1  p) (1  2p)

1  p2   2U + 2t
1  2p+ (1  p)
2
;
and the (relevant) rst-order condition for maximizing this expression is that p satises
((1  p)(1  2p))0 1  p
2   2U + 2t
1  2p+ (1  p) + 2(1  p)(1  2p)

1  p2   2U + 2t
1  2p+ (1  p)
0
= 0
or
(4p  3) (1 p2 2U+2t)+2(1 p)(1 2p)

 2p+ (2 + )( 1  p
2   2U + 2t
1  2p+ (1  p))

= 0 : (19)
37
Given that U = 1
2
(1  p)2   P , expression (17) implies that
U =
(1 + p)(1  p)2   2t(1  2p)
2(1  p) ; (20)
and substituting this value of U into (19) reveals that the equilibrium add-on price p given
 satises
t(1  2p)  (1  p) (t+ 2p(1  p)(1  2p)) = 0 : (21)
When  = 0, this expression has solution p = 1
2
, while when  = 1 it has solution
p = 0. From (21), we can write the  which implements a given add-on price p 2 [0; 1
2
]
as
 =
t(1  2p)
(1  p) (t+ 2p(1  p)(1  2p)) : (22)
Unless t is very small indeed (below 0.01 or so), the above expression decreases with p in
the range p 2 [0; 1
2
], and so there is a one-to-one decreasing relationship between  and
the equilibrium add-on price p. When  satises (22), equilibrium consumer surplus with
add-on price p, which is U in (20), simplies to
U = 1
2
(1  8[p]3 + 11[p]2   4p)  t :
This is U-shapedin p in the relevant range p 2 [0; 1
2
], and hence U-shaped as a function
of . This market has a ripo¤ externality when the initial  is small, while for large 
the market has a search externality. (However, consumer surplus when  = 1, i.e., when
p = 0, is above that when  = 0, i.e., when p = 1
2
.) Likewise, industry prot when the
equilibrium add-on price is p, P (p) + (p), in this example is
2p(1  p)(1  2p) + t ;
which is hump-shaped in p. Thus, industry prot is maximized with a mixed population
of consumers, rather than when all consumers are savvy or all are non-savvy. It is hard
to invert expression (22) to obtain the add-on price p as an explicit function of . It
is straightforward to obtain numerical results, however, and Table 1 in the text reports
outcomes for a range of  when t = 1.
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